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Unnecessary but Proper: The Missouri
Court of Appeals Expands the Constructive




Missouri common law has long held that a constructive trust should be
imposed only in cases of fraud or other wrongful conduct.2 The Missouri
Court of Appeals overruled that precedent in Brown v. Brown, holding that a
mere mistake is a sufficient ground for imposing a constructive trust.3 With
this decision, the court considerably expanded the circumstances under which
a plaintiff may be entitled to this equitable remedy.
While the essential holding of Brown is a positive step for Missouri case
law, the decision failed to distinguish between a mistaken conveyance that is
purely gratuitous and one that is supported by consideration. 4 This Note ex-
plains why such a distinction is necessary and argues that the broad holding
in Brown should be limited to those cases where the conveyance is supported
by consideration. Regardless of whether this proposed limitation is adopted,
Missouri practitioners should be aware that this distinction has the potential
to significantly limit the application of Brown in future cases.
In addition, this Note emphasizes the importance of Missouri's re-
cording act5 in cases where title to property is allegedly affected by the order
in which deeds are recorded. In Brown, the Missouri Court of Appeals ig-
nored the purpose and function of the recording act, concluding that the error
in recording altered the interests of the parties. Practitioners should be aware
of the longstanding principles that suggest that the court erred in reaching this
conclusion.
7
1. 152 S.W.3d 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
2. See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 637 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1982); Beach v. Beach,
207 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Mo. 1948); Ferguson v. Robinson, 167 S.W. 447, 452 (Mo.
1914) (en banc).
3. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 919.
4. See discussion infra Part V.A.
5. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 442.380-.400 (2000).
6. See Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 915, 919-20.
7. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Edward and Catherine Brown purchased twenty acres of rural property
near Odessa, Missouri, in 1966.8 They had four children: John, Pam, Joseph,
and Carolyn.9 When Edward died in 1988, Catherine became the sole owner
of the homestead)10 A year after her husband's death, Catherine executed a
deed granting the property "to [herself] and her son John as joint tenants with
right of survivorship." 1 Eight years later Catherine executed another deed,
conveying "her remaining interest in the land to [herself] and her daughter
Pam as joint tenants with right of survivorship."'' 2 Because this conveyance
did not give Pam an equal interest in the property, the three decided that they
should restructure the title so that each would have a one-third interest in a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. 13 On August 23, 1999, the three took
their previously-recorded deeds and visited attorney Joyce B. Kerber.1
4
At trial, Kerber testified that the three family members asked her to
"prepare appropriate instruments that would leave the property titled in the
names of Catherine, John, and Pam as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship."15 To effectuate this request, Kerber prepared three quitclaim deeds.1
6
The first two deeds were designed to restore Catherine as the sole owner of
the property: one from John and the other from Pam, relinquishing all of their
interest back to their mother.' 7 The third deed was drafted to grant the inter-
ests that the parties intended: from Catherine as sole owner to herself, John,
and Pam as joint tenants with right of survivorship.' 8
On September 30, 1999, Catherine and Pam returned to Kerber's office
and executed the two deeds that were prepared in their names.' 9 On Novem-
ber 1, 1999, John executed the remaining quitclaim deed, and attorney Kerber





13. Id. Catherine's first conveyance granted one-half interests in the property
with right of survivorship to herself and John. See id. Thus, at the time of her convey-
ance to Pam, Catherine could only transfer her one-half interest. See id. Catherine's
conveyance to herself and Pam severed the joint tenancy and split her one-half inter-
est, leaving both her and Pam with one-fourth interests as tenants-in-common. John
still held his one-half interest as a tenant-in-common, but his right of survivorship was
destroyed by Catherine's conveyance to Pam. See generally WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK &
DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.4 (3d ed. 2000).





19. Id. at 915.
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forwarded all three deeds to the Lafayette County Recorder of Deeds for rec-
ordation. When all three deeds arrived at the recorder's office on the same
day, they were recorded in the reverse order of the parties' intention.2' Cath-
erine's deed conveying the joint interest was recorded first, followed by John
and Pam's deeds relinquishing all of their interest back to their mother.22 The
reversed order of recording appeared to destroy the interests that the parties
had intended to create, leaving Catherine with full legal title in fee simple
absolute and her children with nothing.
23
Catherine made one more attempt to transfer the property by executing
and recording a beneficiary deed in April 2002.24 This deed granted a one-
fourth interest to each of her four children with right of survivorship, to be-
25
come effective upon Catherine's death. John and Pam believed that the
1999 conveyances entitled them to a present one-third interest in the property,
which would become a one-half interest if they survived their mother." When
they confronted Catherine about the beneficiary deed, she refused to revoke
it. 27 On June 12, 2002, John and Pam brought this action asking the court to
impose a constructive trust, correcting the recordinf, error and restoring the
parties' rights under the intended 1999 conveyances.
After a one-day trial in Lafayette County Circuit Court, Judge Rolf de-
termined that the 1999 recording error left Catherine as sole owner of the
property, contrary-to the intention of the parties at the time the deeds were
29
executed. Since the intent and purpose of the parties was to convey title to
Catherine, Pam, and John as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the court
issued an order imposing the constructive trust sought by John and Pam.30
Judge Rolf explained that the court's equitable remedy was necessary to pre-
vent the plaintiffs from being defrauded of their property interest and to pre-
vent the defendant from being unjustly enriched. 31 Catherine was ordered to
execute a deed that would restore the parties' originally intended interests.
32
20. Id.
21. Id. Attorney Kerber testified that she could not remember whether she had
included appropriate instructions for recording the deeds in proper order. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Although the recorded documents appeared to leave Catherine as the sole
title holder, the court may have been mistaken in arriving at this conclusion without
further analysis. See discussion infra Part V.B.





29. Id. at 915.
30. Id. at 915-16.




Hassebrock: Hassebrock: Unnecessary but Proper
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Catherine appealed," alleging that "unjust enrichment of one party, ab-
sent a showing of actual or constructive fraud, is insufficient to invoke a con-
structive trust."34 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that "mistake is a
sufficient ground for the imposition ... of a constructive trust."35 The court
declared that "the touchstone for the imposition of a constructive trust is in-
justice or unfairness." 36
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District noted in
Brown v. Brown, the constructive trust is technically not a trust at all. 37 It is
an equitable remedy imposed by the court, providing restitution for one party
while preventing the other from being unjustly enriched.38 Efforts to define a
constructive trust are difficult because a narrow tailoring will inevitably ex-
clude situations in which the remedy should be available. 39 Missouri courts
have echoed the famous words of Justice Cardozo to describe the rationale of
the constructive trust: "A constructive trust is the formula through which the
conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in
such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good con-
science retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.
' 4°
The Restatement (First) of Restitution states that a constructive trust arises
"[w]here a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it.
'41
Plaintiffs seeking a constructive trust bear the burden of establishing
facts that will give rise to this remedy. 42 Missouri courts have elevated plain-
tiffs' burden by requiring "an extraordinary degree of proof' to establish a
constructive trust.43 The Missouri Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he
evidence must be so clear, cogent, and convincing as to exclude every rea-
33. Catherine filed a timely notice of appeal but died before oral argument. Id. at
913 n. 1. Her son Joseph, successor in interest to her property, was substituted as the
appellant. Id.
34. Id. at 916.
35. Id. at 919.
36. Id. at 918.
37. Id. at 916 (citing Schultz v. Schultz, 637 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)).
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. c, d (1937).
39. 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 462, at 302 (4th ed. 1989).
40. Lucas v. Cent. Mo. Trust Co., 166 S.W.2d 1053, 1058 (Mo. 1942) (quoting
Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919)).
41. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
42. 5 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 39, § 462.6, at 327-30.
43. Fix v. Fix, 847 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Mo. 1993).
[Vol. 71
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sonable doubt in the mind of the trial court."" Although the rationale of this
greater burden has been questioned by at least one preeminent scholar, 45 Mis-
souri law still applies the heightened standard.
46
The constructive trust existed as a remedy long before the release of the
Restatement, but it had limited availability to plaintiffs. In early Missouri
cases, courts only granted constructive trusts where the unjustly enriched
party had committed fraud.47 A 1914 decision of the Missouri Supreme Court
stated that "fraud, either actual or constructive, is the very foundation" of the
constructive trust.
48
The Missouri Supreme Court waited only a year before adopting the Re-
statement definition of constructive trust after it was promulgated in 1937. 49
In Suhre v. Busch, the court affirmed the earlier line of cases establishing
fraud as the basis of a constructive trust.50 The court then expanded the con-
structive trust doctrine to include cases where plaintiffs had been deprived of
property as a result of the "violation of confidence or faith reposed in an-
other."5 ' This expanded rule, however, still required some wrongful conduct
on the part of the defendant before a constructive trust could be imposed.52
The constructive trust doctrine was revisited by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1955, when it addressed the "many, and somewhat confusing, defini-
tions of a constructive trust." 5 3 The court conceded that Missouri courts had
split between those requiring actual or constructive fraud in cases imposing a
constructive trust and those "proceed[ing] upon the theory of unjust enrich-
ment ... without any proof of fraudulent intent."54 The court also recognized
that the constructive fraud requirement may be "an expression of the idea that
a constructive trust may arise in the absence of fraud."55 The Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District followed this unjust enrichment theory
when it imposed a constructive trust in McFarland v. Braddy.56 In
McFarland, the court held that a deed mistakenly excluding the wife's name
was subject to a constructive trust because it was a "classic case of unjust
44. Id.
45. 5 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 39, § 462.6, at 327-30 ("Ordinarily, how-
ever, there would seem to be no good reason why such proof should be required.").
46. Brown v. Brown, 152 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
47. See, e.g., Parker v. Blakeley, 93 S.W.2d 981, 988 (Mo. 1936); Norton v. Nor-
ton, 43 S.W.2d 1024, 1031 (Mo. 1931); Bryan v. McCaskill, 225 S.W. 682, 687-88
(Mo. 1920) (en banc); Ferguson v. Robinson, 167 S.W. 447, 452 (Mo. 1914) (en banc).
48. Ferguson, 167 S.W. at 452.
49. Suhre v. Busch, 123 S.W.2d 8, 15-16 (Mo. 1938).
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18, 25 (Mo. 1955).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 26.
56. 560 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
2006]
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enrichment.""7 The McFarland court, however, based its decision on a breach
of the confidential relationship between husband and wife and did not assert
that mistake was a sufficient basis for imposing a constructive trust.
58
In 1983, the possibility of mistake as a sufficient ground for imposing a
constructive trust arose in a footnote in a Missouri decision.59 In 1990, the
court of appeals went a step further, declaring that the constructive trust "be-
came the means for restitution from one unjustly enriched by the mistake of
another, even though the mistake was not induced by fraud or misrepresenta-
tion.",60 Language that included mistake as a sufficient ground for the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust occasionally appeared in Missouri case law61 until
the decision in Brown v. Brown explicitly expanded the doctrine. Prior to
Brown, however, no Missouri cases had unequivocally imposed a construc-
tive trust based solely on mistake.62
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A unanimous three-judge panel of the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District began by making some general observations regarding con-
structive trusts.63 This opening dialogue established, in very broad language,
the court's authority to impose a constructive trust as an equitable remedy
where one 'has acquired property under such circumstances as make it ineq-
uitable for him to retain it."' 6
After identifying the basis for its authority, the court assessed the appel-
lant's claim that unjust enrichment was not a sufficient ground to support the
imposition of a constructive trust.65 Quickly refuting this claim, the court
57. Id. at 264; see also Proffit v. Houseworth, 231 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. 1950).
58. See McFarland, 560 S.W.2d at 264.
59. Maize v. Maize, 652 S.W.2d 751, 753 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
60. Petrie v. LeVan, 799 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 163 (1937)).
61. See, e.g., Thumon v. Ludy, 914 S.W.2d 32, 34-35 (in order to impose a con-
structive trust, the evidence must "show fraud, undue influence, mental incapacity or
mistake").
62. The Brown court primarily relied on two Missouri decisions as support for a
broader interpretation of the constructive trust doctrine. Brown v. Brown, 152 S.W.3d
911, 917-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). However, those decisions do not directly hold that
a constructive trust can be imposed where unjust enrichment results solely from a
mistake. In Cole v. Morris, the court applied the equitable remedy of subrogation in
granting restitution, and did not impose a constructive trust at all. 409 S.W.2d 668
(Mo. 1966). In Proffit v. Houseworth, the court stated that the omission of the plain-
tiff s name from the deed constituted constructive fraud, which was a sufficient basis
for the constructive trust. 231 S.W.2d 612, 617-18 (Mo. 1950).
63. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 916.
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noted that prior Missouri decisions had adopted the view of the Restatement
(First) of Restitution, which explicitly states that the constructive trust is an
appropriate remedy in the case of unjust enrichment.66 This view was es-
poused by the Missouri Supreme Court in 193867 and reinforced in 1961,
when the court stated that "a constructive trust is an equitable device to pre-
vent injustice, particularly unjust enrichment."6 8 Accordingly, the appellant's
argument was rejected.69
Next, the appellant contended that a constructive trust was proper only if
the plaintiff made a showing of fraud or other tortious conduct by the defen-
dant.70 Agreeing that a constructive trust would be proper in cases where the
defendant had committed some wrongful act, the court was not convinced
that the wrongful conduct of the defendant was a prerequisite to the remedy.
7
'
The court cited Cole v. Morris72 as authority rejecting the appellant's posi-
tion.73 In Cole, an injured employee collected benefits from an injury fund
and also recovered from a third-party tortfeasor, thereby collecting twice on
the same injury.74 Even though the employee had not acted wrongfully, the
Missouri Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust and returned the money
to the treasurer of the injury fund to prevent the employee from being un-
justly enriched. 75 The Brown court relied on Cole, concluding that "it is not
necessary that the unjustly enriched party be found to have engaged in legal
wrongdoing. ''76 The court indicated its intent that constructive trusts can be
applied in a broad range of circumstances, stating that the constructive trust is
a "fluid, flexible device which may be employed to remedy many different
types of injustice. 77
The court then rejected the appellant's argument that mistake is insuffi-
cient to justify the court's equitable remedy, declaring that "a constructive
trust arises where the title to property is acquired through a mistake. 78 The
court relied on Proffit v. Houseworth,79 a 1950 Missouri Supreme Court case,
to demonstrate this principle. 0 In Proffit, the plaintiff claimed that he should
66. Id. at 916-17 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937)).
67. See Suhre v. Busch, 123 S.W.2d 8, 15-16 (Mo. 1938).
68. Cohn v. Jefferson Say. & Loan Ass'n, 349 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo. 1961)
(citation omitted).
69. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 917.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 409 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1966).
73. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 917-18.
74. Cole, 409 S.W.2d at 669.
75. Id. at 670-71.
76. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 918.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting 5 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 39, § 462.2, at 314-15).
79. 231 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. 1950).
80. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 918-19.
2006]
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have been included as a purchaser of property despite the fact that his name
did not appear on the contract of sale.8 The Proffit court held that a construc-
tive trust should be imposed in favor of the plaintiff even if his name was
omitted from the contract by mistake.8 2 Based on this holding, the Brown
court concluded that "mistake is a sufficient ground for the imposition and
enforcement of a constructive trust."
8 3
The court recognized that their decision expanded prior Missouri case
law which established fraud as the foundation of the constructive trust.4 Cit-
ing authority that "reflected this outdated view," the court declared that Mis-
souri courts now recognize that constructive trusts "may be imposed in
broader circumstances."85 While not directly overruling the contrary author-
ity, Brown made it clear that a showing of unjust enrichment, whether by
fraud, mistake, or otherwise, is a sufficient basis to support the imposition of
a constructive trust.8
6
The court concluded that the trial court had not erred in imposing the
87constructive trust. Echoing Judge Rolf's circuit court order, the court of
appeals agreed that Catherine became the sole owner of the property due to
the recording error.88 Catherine's later execution of the beneficiary deed vio-
81. Proffit, 231 S.W.2d at 614.
82. Id. at 617. Interestingly, the defendant in Proffit also asserted that a construc-
tive trust was only appropriate in cases of fraud or other wrongful conduct. Id. Al-
though apparently given the opportunity to overrule that precedent, the court instead
declared that the omission of the plaintiff's name constituted "constructive fraud." Id.
83. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 919.
84. Id.
85. Id. See, e.g., Parker v. Blakeley, 93 S.W.2d 981, 988 (1936) ("fraud is an
essential element of [a] constructive trust"); Matlock v. Matlock, 815 S.W.2d 110,
114 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991) ("Constructive trusts are based upon actual or constructive
fraud."); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 655 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983) ("Fraud,
either actual or constructive, is the essential element for imposition of a constructive
trust."); Beck v. Beck, 728 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Mo. App. S.D. 1987) ("[P]laintiff argues
that a constructive trust can be imposed even without a finding of fraud or the exis-
tence of a confidential relationship. Plaintiff does not, however, cite any case support-
ing that hypothesis.").
86. Id. at 918-19.
[A]lthough older Missouri cases limited utilization of constructive trusts
exclusively to circumstances involving actual or constructive fraud or the
violation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship, Missouri courts, led
by our Supreme Court, now recognize ... that they may be imposed in
broader circumstances, including where the evidence establishes that due
to a mistake, the defendant received property belonging to plaintiff under
conditions that in equity the defendant ought not be allowed to retain it.
Id. at 919.
87. Id. at 919-20.
88. Id. at 919.
[Vol. 71
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lated her duty to John and Pam as "equitable co-owners of the property."8 9
The court held that equity required the property be restored to its rightful
owners and, thus, affirmed the imposition of the constructive trust.90
Finally, the appellant argued that the decision to remedy the recording
mistake should be reversed because it was against the weight of the evi-
dence.9 1 The court conceded that the burden of proof to establish a construc-
tive trust is considerable, 92 but it held that the plaintiffs had met their burden
sufficiently in this case.93 The appellant relied on Catherine's testimony that
the three quitclaim deeds had actually been recorded in the proper order and
the fact that Catherine had expressed her intent to be restored as the sole
owner of the property. 94 The court was not convinced by this argument be-
cause Catherine's testimony was not supported by the facts. If Catherine,
John, and Pam had agreed to restore Catherine as the sole owner, only the two
quitclaim deeds from John and Pam would be necessary to effectuate that
intent.95 Additionally, the court noted that the one unbiased witness, attorney
Kerber, corroborated the plaintiffs' assertion that Catherine intended to trans-
fer title to the property to herself, John, and Pam as joint tenants with right of
survivorship.96 Deferring to Judge Rolf's determination of Catherine's credi-
bility, the court was satisfied that there was substantial evidence to support
97the imposition of a constructive trust in this case.
Although the court of appeals agreed with the reasoning and the deci-
sion of the trial court, the case was remanded so that judgment could be en-
tered to reflect Catherine's death.98 Affirming the constructive trust, the opin-
ion concluded by advising the trial court to choose an appropriate method by
which the constructive trust would be imposed. 99
89. Id.
90. Id. at 919-20.
91. Id. at 920.
92. Id. "To establish a constructive trust, an extraordinary degree of proof is
required. The evidence must be unquestionable in character. The evidence must be so
clear, cogent, and convincing as to exclude every reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trial court." Id. (citing Fix v. Fix, 847 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
93. Id. at 921.
94. Id.
95. Id. The third deed from Catherine granting the joint tenancy served no pur-




99. Id. at 921-22. The court suggested that the constructive trust could be imple-
mented in several ways: compel the trustees to convey the property to John and Pam,
revest title in John and Pam by court decree, or cancel Catherine's beneficiary deed
and quiet title in John and Pam. Id.
2006]
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V. COMMENT
Although Brown v. Brown may be an appropriate step forward for Mis-
souri case law, the court failed to identify and resolve issues that are likely to
emerge in the wake of this case. First, in deciding to impose a constructive trust
in a case of mistake, the Brown decision did not differentiate a gratuitous con-
veyance from one supported by consideration. Since the outcome of the case
may have depended upon this distinction, it is important that practitioners fac-
ing a challenge to Brown understand the unstated limitations of its holding.
Second, the court erred in concluding that the mistake in recording had
any effect on the interests of the parties. In cases where the recording of instru-
ments is alleged to affect interests in land, practitioners should consider the
purpose and function of the recording laws before concluding that the order of
recordation determines the passage of title. The court's decision in Brown dem-
onstrates its ignorance of the recording laws applicable to the case.
The following critique attempts to clarify these issues in order to prevent
Missouri practitioners from adopting the Brown decision at face value.
A. Conveyance Ineffective Due to Mistake
In Brown, the court did not apply the constructive trust to restore the
parties to the positions they were in before the transfer.1° Instead, Cath-
erine's children sought the constructive trust to compel her to carry out her
original gratuitous intention in conveying the property. 10 1 As explained by
leading scholars:
In this situation there is more difficulty in the way of imposing a
constructive trust. Where property is conveyed by mistake, the
grantor seeks to restore the status quo by compelling the grantee to
make a reconveyance. Where by mistake there is a failure to con-
vey property, the grantee seeks to compel the grantor to carry out
his original intention. In the one case the attempt is made to put the
parties in the position in which they were before the mistake was
made; in the other case the attempt is made to put the parties in the
position not where they were before the mistake was made but
where they would have been if no mistake had been made.'
0 2
Ultimately, if John and Pam had paid consideration for their mother's
ineffective conveyance, they would have unquestionably been entitled to a
100. See generally id.
101. See id.
102. Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 39, § 466, at 343. Amazingly, the Brown court
cited to the very same section and page of the treatise where this language is found, yet
the court ignored this distinction in resolving the case. Brown, 152 S.W.3d at 918.
[Vol. 71
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constructive trust.'0 3 Where the failed conveyance is gratuitous, however, the
donee cannot ordinarily compel the donor to complete the intended gift by
making an effective conveyance. 1 4 This is true because the donor is not un-
justly enriched at the expense of the donee. Rather, the donor has simply
failed to make the intended gift.
Similarly, because Catherine's conveyances to John and Pam were gra-
tuitous, she was not unjustly enriched by the failed conveyances. Catherine
had previously been the sole owner of the property and had received no con-
sideration for the transfer to her children. Thus, when Catherine was restored
as the sole owner (due to the reverse recording of the three quitclaim deeds),
she received no benefit at the expense of John and Pam. 10 5 In other words, she
was not unjustly enriched. Without unjust enrichment, "there is no ground for
imposing upon [her] a duty to carry out [her] generous intention."" The Re-
statement (First) of Restitution provides additional support for this view: "[I]f
the owner of property makes a gratuitous conveyance of it to another and the
conveyance is ineffective to transfer the property, the owner continues to hold
the property for his own benefit and no constructive trust arises."
10 7
The Brown decision did not draw this distinction, nor did the court even
consider whether any consideration was given in exchange for the convey-
ance. It appears that Catherine was merely trying to pass the property to her
children upon her death.108 The opinion provides no indication that either
John or Pam paid any consideration to their mother for this benefit. In fact,
given Catherine's penchant for executing deeds, there is doubt as to whether
she had any legal understanding of how her interest in the property was af-
103. ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 39, § 466, at 343.
Where a conveyance of land is made for consideration, and by mistake the
conveyance is ineffective to transfer the land .... the grantee is entitled to
reformation of the deed. In such a case the grantor holds the land, which
was intended to be conveyed, upon a constructive trust for the grantee.
Id.
104. Id. at 344. "It is accordingly well settled that where the owner of land makes
a gratuitous conveyance of the land that is ineffective to transfer it, he may continue
to hold the land free of trust." Id.
105. John and Pam might have argued that they gave up their present interests in
the land by executing the quitclaim deeds as consideration for their mother's promise
to reconvey the property to all three of them equally as joint tenants. However, as-
suming that those initial conveyances were also gratuitous, John and Pam have not
suffered any real expense, and Catherine has not been unjustly enriched by being
restored to her original position as sole owner.
106. ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 39, § 466, at 344.
107. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 164 cmt. a (1937).
108. The fact that all of Catherine's transfers included a right of survivorship
coupled with her later execution of the beneficiary deed supports this conclusion. See
Brown v. Brown, 152 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
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fected by all of these transfers.'0 9 Since all of Catherine's conveyances were
probably gratuitous, the court should not have granted the constructive trust
without further evidence that John and Pam had paid consideration for Cath-
erine's transfer. The proper disposition would have been a remand to the trial
court for further evidence on the issue of consideration.
B. Delivery and Recording of the Deeds
Amidst all the discussion of constructive trusts in Brown v. Brown,"1
0
the Missouri Court of Appeals entirely ignored what should have been the
dispositive issue in the case: did the alleged mistake in recording the deeds
have any effect on the interests of the parties? Without any analysis, the court
decided that it did: "the result of the order of the filing of the deeds was that
Catherine held the property in fee simple absolute."' The court failed to
consider whether the deeds in this case had been properly delivered, and if so,
how the later error in the order of recording would affect the valid deliveries.
A valid deed becomes effective and passes title at the moment it is de-
livered from the grantor to the grantee.1 2 Traditionally this occurs when the
deed is handed over to the grantee, but a physical passing of the document is
not required to establish a delivery of the deed." 13 The delivery is a "question
of the grantor's intent."'" 4 If the grantor did not intend to transfer the interest,
then there is no conveyance even where the deed has been physically passed
to the grantee.1 5 Likewise, if the grantor so intends, there can be a valid de-
livery and title may pass even though the deed remains in the grantor's pos-
session.116 Additionally, a deed may be delivered through an agent of thegrantee, so long as the proper intent exists in the grantor." 7
109. Based on Catherine's conveyances to John in 1989 and Pam in 1997, fol-
lowed by the decision to restructure the title, id. at 914, it seems evident that Cath-
erine did not initially comprehend the legal ramifications of the deeds she had
granted. Evidence suggests, however, that Kerber advised Catherine of her rights with
respect to the property at the time Kerber prepared the three deeds. Id. at 914.
In fact, if Catherine lacked legal understanding of the interests that she had ini-
tially passed to John and Pain and those conveyances were gratuitous, Catherine would
likely be entitled to restitution in accord with whatever her intentions were at the time of
those conveyances. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 49 cmt. a, illus. 4 (1937).
110. 152 S.W.3d 911.
111. Id. at 915.
112. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 13, § 11.3, at 828 (3d ed. 2000).
113. Id. If the grantee takes possession "it generally raises a strong presumption of
delivery, while nondelivery is presumed if the grantor retains possession." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 832.
116. Id. at 828.
117. Id. at 832.
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Missouri has long recognized that title to land passes at the time the
deed is delivered.' 8 Early decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court confirm
that manual delivery to the grantee is not required, and that delivery to a third
person is sufficient where evidence shows the grantor's intent to transfer ti-
tle. " 9 Some of these early decisions emphasize that the grantor must part with
"all dominion and control" over the deed.' 20 Although this language appears
to be inconsistent with the principle that the grantor can retain possession of
the deed and still make a valid delivery, courts continue to use the language
in recent decisions.' 21 Remarkably, in LeMehaute v. LeMehaute,122 the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals for the Western District upheld delivery of a deed still
in the grantor's possession while affirming that the "dominion and control"
over the deed must pass from the grantor to the grantee.' 23 The LeMehaute
decision relied on the recording of the deed as presumptive evidence of deliv-
ery, even though the grantor retained possession of the instrument.1 24
Additionally, acceptance of a deed by the grantee is generally required
to complete the delivery and transfer title.' 25 While Missouri law recognizes
this requirement, acceptance is generally presumed unless there is contrary
evidence.'26 This presumption places the burden of proof on the party alleg-
ing the lack of delivery of the deed.' 27 Missouri courts also presume accep-
118. See Klatt v. Wolff, 173 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. 1943) ("[D]elivery gives the in-
strument force and effect."); Barth v. Haase, 139 S.W.2d 1058, 1061 (Mo. 1940)
("Delivery is the crowning act in the complete execution of a deed ...."); Seibel v.
Higham, 115 S.W. 987, 990 (Mo. 1908) ("Delivery... is the final act that consum-
mates the deed."); Parsons v. Parsons, 45 Mo. 265, 268-69 (1870) ("A valid deed,
once delivered, has the effect of vesting the title in the grantee.").
119. Seibel, 115 S.W. at 990; Hall v. Hall, 17 S.W. 811, 812-13 (Mo. 1891).
120. Dallas v. McNutt, 249 S.W. 35, 36 (Mo. 1923); Sneathen v. Sneathen, 16 S.W.
497, 499 (Mo. 1891); see Standiford v. Standiford, 10 S.W. 836, 838 (Mo. 1889).
121. Rhodes v. Hunt, 913 S.W.2d 894, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); see Meadows v.
Brich, 606 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
122. 585 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
123. Id. at 279-80.
124. Id. at 279.
125. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 13, § 11.3, at 832.
126. See. e.g., Pollock v. Brown, 569 S.W.2d 724, 734 (Mo. 1978) (en banc);
Ragan v. Ragan, 445 S.W.2d 825, 826-27 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
127. Cleary v. Cleary, 273 S.W.2d 340, 346 (Mo. 1954). This is true where one
party seeks to invalidate a deed based upon a lack of delivery. A party claiming title
under a deed, however, may be required to establish that the deed was delivered.
Reasor v. Marshall, 221 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Mo. 1949); see Turner v. Mallemee, 640
S.W.2d 517, 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Meadows v. Brich, 606 S.W.2d 258, 260-61
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980). These cases generally involve a deed that has not been recorded
and is not in the grantee's possession. See Turner, 640 S.W.2d at 519; Meadows, 606
S.W.2d at 261; Reasor, 221 S.W.2d at 116-17. This shift of the burden of proof is
consistent with the rule announced in Galloway v. Galloway: "The burden of proof in
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tance in cases where the transfer is beneficial to the grantee, and since a grant
of land is typically beneficial, the presumption is common.128 The recording
of a deed, which establishes a prima facie case for delivery,129 also creates a
presumption in favor of acceptance.'
30
In Brown, the trial court found that the intent of the parties was to place
title to the property in Catherine, John, and Pam as joint tenants with right of
survivorship.13 Kerber had prepared three deeds to accomplish that result.'
32
On September 30, 1999, Catherine and Pam went to Kerber's office, executed
their two deeds, and left them with Kerber.' 33 The deeds could not be deemed
delivered at that point because the two deeds by themselves would not have
accomplished the intentions of the parties. In other words, since neither of the
grantors intended the deeds to be delivered without the third deed having
been executed, the grantor's intent was insufficient to constitute delivery.
On November 1, 1999, John went to Kerber's office, executed the third
deed, and left it with Kerber.134 At this point, Kerber had possession of all
three executed deeds, and each of the parties had left his or her deed with
Kerber intending that it be delivered in the proper order. Each party had
parted with control over the deed by leaving it with Kerber to be recorded.
Therefore, at the time Kerber sent the deeds to be recorded, each deed had
already been delivered as intended by the parties. Since title passes at the time
of delivery and the deeds had been delivered as intended by Catherine, John,
and Pam, title to the property had already passed according to the intention of
the parties prior to the deeds ever being recorded.
After determining that title has passed at the time of delivery, the next
question is whether the reverse order of recording could affect the interests of
the parties. This inquiry requires an examination of Missouri's recording
act.' 35 The Missouri Supreme Court has declared that the "general and basic
purpose" of the recording act is to provide "a system of statutory priorities for
the protection of subsequent purchasers of land."'136 Missouri has adopted the
any case rests upon the party, plaintiff or defendant, who... asserts the affirmative of
an issue." 169 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Mo. 1943).
128. Wilkie v. Elmore, 395 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Mo. 1965).
129. Ragan, 445 S.W.2d at 826.
130. See Deer v. King, 30 S.W.2d 980, 982 (Mo. 1930). This rationale is apparent
if acceptance is considered an element of a valid delivery, a proposition for which
there is substantial authority. See, e.g., Wilkie, 395 S.W.2d at 172 ("[A]cceptance
necessary to delivery.").
131. Brown v. Brown, 152 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
132. Id. at 914.
133. Id. at 915.
134. Id.
135. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 442.380-.400 (2000).
136. Dreckshage v. Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 555 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Mo. 1977)
(citing 6 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 913 (1977)). Nearly all of the recording acts cur-
rently used in the United States only serve to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers of
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"notice" type of recording act, which protects the subsequent bona fide pur-
chaser who takes title without actual notice of a prior unrecorded instru-
ment.13 7 A bona fide purchaser is defined by Missouri case law as "one who
pays valuable consideration, has no notice of the outstanding rights of others
and who acts in good faith."'1
38
Specifically, the Missouri recording statute provides that "[n]o such in-
strument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and
such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the
recorder for record."' 139 As one Missouri court has noted, the "recording act is
not based upon the priority of recording of two conflicting conveyances, but
instead is based upon notice."' 40 Because the purpose of the recording act is
to protect subsequent purchasers of real estate by ensuring that the public
record accurately reflects the passage of title, the act is inapplicable to cases
such as Brown, where the recording affects only parties to the transaction or
those who have actual notice.' 41 Since Catherine, John, and Pam were all
land. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 13, § 11.10, at 879. For further discussion of the
types of recording statutes used in the United States, see id. § 11.9, at 87 1-74.
137. Obemay v. Chamberlin, 506 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
138. Landshire Food Serv., Inc. v. Coghill, 709 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (citing J.C. Equip., Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973)).
139. Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.400 (2000) (emphasis added).
140. Henson v. Wagner, 642 S.W.2d 357, 360-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citation
omitted).
141. See Harrison v. Moore, 199 S.W. 188, 189-90 (Mo. 1917), which states:
It should also be remembered that the recording act was designed to have
the record of land titles to carry absolute verity upon its face, except in the
two instances mentioned, namely, between the parties to the deed and all
others who have actual notice of the existence of the unrecorded deed; so,
in all other cases where the record is fair upon its face, persons who pur-
chase real estate relying upon that fact acquire a good title against the
world, and before that title can be defeated it must be shown that such
purchaser was either a party to the unrecorded deed or that he had actual
notice thereof, and the burden of proving those facts rests upon those who
claim under the unrecorded instrument, as will be shown by the authorities
to be presently considered; otherwise, the record of land titles would be of
but little, if any, benefit to any one in purchasing real estate.
Id. Additionally, "one seeking to avoid an unrecorded instrument must not only sub-
sequently purchase, but must pay a valuable consideration." Henson, 642 S.W.2d at
361. A valuable consideration requires that "[t]he purchase price, or a substantial part
of it, must be paid." Id. at 362 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). It is un-
necessary to determine whether John and Pam paid any valuable consideration to
Catherine for her conveyance, since their notice of the instruments prior to recording
would deny them protection as bona fide purchasers. However, their failure to pay
consideration for the transfer would also bar John and Pam from asserting any rights
as bona fide purchasers. "Obviously donees do not qualify" for bona fide purchaser
status. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 13, § 11.10, at 879.
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parties to the transaction and all had actual notice of the deeds to be recorded,
the recording statute would do nothing to alter the interests conveyed by the
parties at the time the deeds were delivered.
The Brown decision did not properly consider the purpose or function of
Missouri's recording act. The court did not suggest that either John or Pam
were subsequent purchasers taking without notice of those instruments. In
fact, the evidence conclusively demonstrated that both John and Pam had
actual notice of the instruments to be recorded. Since John and Pam were not
bona fide purchasers to whom the recording act would be applicable, the or-
der in which the deeds were recorded had no effect on the passage of title at
the time of delivery.
Ultimately, to reach the proper conclusion, the Missouri court of appeals
merely had to affirm the trial court's determination of the intention of the
parties at the time the deeds were executed. Since the deeds were delivered in
the proper order, Catherine had effectively transferred the property to herself,
John, and Pam as joint tenants with right of survivorship despite the recording
error. The court reached the proper outcome in Brown, but should have done
so by analyzing the purpose and effect of the parties' intentions and the re-
cording act. This analysis would have left the court without any reason to
misconstrue the constructive trust doctrine.
V1. CONCLUSION
For the moment, it appears that the Missouri court of appeals has opened
the doors of the courthouse a little wider for plaintiffs seeking equitable relief
in the form of a constructive trust. However, the distinction between a gratui-
tous conveyance and one supported by consideration should eventually result
in a limitation on the broad holding of Brown v. Brown.142 A limited expan-
sion of the constructive trust doctrine that would protect those paying consid-
eration in cases of mistake is a positive step forward for Missouri case law.
In addition to identifying this limitation, this Note has exposed the pit-
falls of ignoring the effect of Missouri's recording act.143 The recording act
has a limited effect in protecting subsequent bona fide purchasers of land. In
cases where title to property is allegedly affected by the order in which deeds
are recorded, the operation of the recording act is vital in determining the
interests of the parties. The failure to recognize the purpose and function of
the recording act resulted in an unnecessary expansion of the constructive
trust doctrine in Brown. Fortunately for the plaintiffs in this case, that fault
did not prevent the court from reaching the proper outcome.
BENJAMIN C HASSEBROCK
142. See discussion supra Part V.A.
143. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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